Forget the so-called “hostage talks,” which are simply a mechanism for stretching out the war and increasing pressure on Israel. They are a sign of American desperation for a political victory. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, according to Egyptian sources, aims to “persuade both Hamas and Israel to embrace the American proposal without adding complications.”
Aside from the repugnant equation of “both” Hamas and Israel, “complications” are what are known as “war goals.” Israel had three at the outset: to secure the borders and the people of Israel; to uproot the Hamas military and governing capability in Gaza; and to get the hostages back.
How is Israel doing?
If you want a political opinion about Israel’s war, ask a pol. If you want a military opinion, ask a military officer.
John Spencer, Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, gives us a starting place. Writing in Foreign Affairs, he says: “War is the pursuit of political objectives … (and) has a start and a finish, so its progress can be assessed based on how close each side has come to meeting its political objectives. By this measure, it is Israel, not Hamas, that now holds the advantage.”
Political objectives? The United States told Israel it could not achieve political objectives through warfare. Spencer disagrees. “Brute force is what gives Hamas the ability to rule over the population of Gaza. If it succeeds (in eliminating Hamas’s military capabilities), Israel can prevent Hamas from reclaiming its pre–October 7 position.”
Andrew Fox, a former British paratrooper and Sandhurst senior lecturer, who is cognizant of strong U.S. opposition to Israel entering Rafah in southern Gaza, asks in The Spectator: “Why go into Rafah at all? Simply because the aim is to destroy Hamas. That involves finding and degrading their capability, and that capability hinges on the supply tunnels from Rafah into Egypt, some of which run 2 km beyond the Egyptian border … The alternative is to face inestimable casualties.”
(Digression: Now you know why the Egyptian “mediators” are opposed to Israel controlling the southern side of the Rafah crossing. It would: 1. expose the depth of Cairo’s partnership with Hamas, which is allied with Iran, and 2. prevent the restoration of that financially lucrative partnership later.)
Fox made a relevant side point: Nearly 3,000 Israeli military vehicles “have needed some level of repair due to enemy damage” – but “Hamas has only succeeded in destroying four armored vehicles in nine months (two main battle tanks and two armored personnel carriers). Objectively, this is pitiful by Hamas. They are taking an astonishingly one-sided battering.”
Spencer agrees. Speaking of southern Israel, he notes: “The imminent danger of rocket attacks has dropped significantly in these areas. There were more than 6,000 alerts about incoming rockets from Gaza the week of October 7, but now most weeks the number of alerts is in the single digits, low double digits, or even zero. Israel is even adding an extra layer of defense to its border with Gaza. In the past, Israel relied on just a wall at the border for protection. Now Israeli forces are creating a security zone of around half a mile from the wall.”
Israeli analyst Saul Sadka wrote that Israel is presently taking control of the port of Khan Yunis, along with widening the Rafah corridor, and the 6 km-wide Netzarim corridor that separates Gaza City from the rest of the Strip, “Gaza is now cut into three. The humanitarian zone is now also cut in two by the new corridor. Expect this new corridor to be fortified … to separate Beit Hanoun from Gaza City and to separate Rafah from Khan Younis.”
This is making military resupply almost impossible, while allowing for civilian traffic.
He notes: “The only urban areas that the [Israeli Defense Forces] have yet to enter in force (though they are already starting) are the towns in the central portion, Deir al Balah and Nuseirat. Only there can the Hamas infrastructure still be anything like its pre-war level.”
That is where he – and others – presume Yahya Sinwar is cowering, begging for a deal that will allow him to escape unharmed and remain alive. What happened to the glory of martyrdom for Palestine? A lot of Palestinian parents who lost their children to this disgusting fraud should be ready for revolution against Sinwar and his remaining minions.
Spencer explains: “Hamas’s authority in Gaza is much shakier today than it was on October 7. Although Hamas remains the main political power, it must now use heinous force in order to govern. Hamas militants kill civilians in Gaza, including clan or tribal leaders, who challenge the group’s brutal rule.”
This is, in fact, how military success begins to translate into political success, where the military defeats a vicious dictatorship – as in Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan.
Take away the weapons. Take away control of territory. Take away control of the population. Military defeat of Hamas can become liberation for the Palestinian people and security for the people of Israel.
