A Clarion Call: Taiwan and the US Need to Do More

On 2 September, Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal called “The U.S. and Taiwan Must Change Course” that defends his position that the US and Taiwan are not doing enough to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from taking Taiwan. Colby is correct, of course: the US and Taiwan need to do a lot more or the PRC will invade Taiwan like Russia did against Ukraine.

In this article, I will explain how the US and Taiwan have failed to prepare properly to deter war. At the end of the article, I recommend some immediate actions for the US and Taiwan to restore deterrence.

The blame must fall on politicians and policymakers in charge of both countries since 1999 when the PRC’s rise coincided with its massive investment in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). American administrations failed to follow its commitment in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and Taiwan has not implemented sufficiently its own commitments to self-defense.

Taiwan Relations Act

The US has not met its commitments in the TRA related to the PRC threat. Below are the relevant sections.

Comment: For decades, the US has denied, slow-rolled, cancelled or prevented several weapons orders for a variety of reasons. Luckily, in the past other countries such as Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and UK filled in some gaps. Recent US military training initiatives in the 2023 and 2024 National Defense Authorization Acts have been beneficial.

But fundamentally, Taiwan today does not have the defense articles it needs “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Secondly, the President has not informed Congress that Taiwan needs have not been met.

“SECTION. 3. (c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the US arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.”

Comment: Since 1999, the PRC has dramatically increased its defense budget. The CCP has ratcheted up its threatening actions against Taiwan continuously since 2021, with large jumps after significant events such as the visit of the former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. Just like the anaconda snake kills its prey by increasing asphyxiation, the CCP does not return to the status quo ante (previously existing state of affairs) after these significant events. The CCP creates a new status quo and then squeezes Taiwan again.

Most recently, in May 2024, Taiwan witnessed the most aggressive military naval and air intimidation seen to date.  The Joint Sword 2024A exercise included more PLA Navy (PLAN) and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels working together than in any other previous exercise against Taiwan and the largest number of PLA fighter aircraft median line crossings up to that date.

Specifically, from 23-24 May, 49 PLA aircraft (35 aircraft flew across the Taiwan Strait median line), 19 PLAN vessels, and 16 CCG vessels (9 CCG vessels around Taiwan’s outer islands and 7 CCG vessels operating around Taiwan). The CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) ordered the deployment of four CCG vessels along the eastern coast of Taiwan and three CCG vessels near the southern entrance of the Taiwan Strait to practice blockading operations. On 24-25 May, 62 PLA aircraft (47 aircraft crossed the median line) and 27 PLAN vessels were operating around Taiwan.

Additionally, for the first time, the CCG conducted intimidating maneuvers very close to Taiwan’s outer islands (Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqui, and Dongyin).

When the PLA Air Force, Navy, and the CCG came very close to Taiwan in May 2024, the US and the ROC (Republic of China – Taiwan) militaries did nothing to force PRC forces to retreat. A PLA fighter jet or a missile fired from the jet fighter at Taiwan can travel 24 NM in less than one minute. The ROC military must now operate in fifty percent less space since the loss of the midline which is approximately 50 miles from Taiwan.

The ROC military has less than a minute to decide what to do in case any of these forces decide to cross into Taiwan’s contiguous zone or into Taiwan’s territory. This is an example of the CMC conducting the anaconda warfare strategy against Taiwan’s military and population.

Will the next CMC exercise move to just beyond Taiwan’s twelve-mile territorial waters and decrease the reaction time to CCP aggression to less than thirty seconds? What is the US and ROC planning to do to prevent the CCP from using its Anaconda Strategy of decreasing the physical space for the ROC military to react to?

At the end of the CMC Joint Sword 2024A, the PRC Defense spokesman said: “Every time ‘Taiwan independence’ provokes us, we will push our countermeasures one step further, until the complete reunification of the motherland is achieved.” This is precisely the way the anaconda snake kills its prey.

More Relevant TRA Sections

Section 2 (b): “It is the policy of the US to make clear that the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

Comment: This paragraph means that if the PRC pursues war against Taiwan, the US will severe its relationship with Beijing. The US has never publicly threatened to use this hammer against the PRC.

Section 2(b) continues: “It is the policy of the US to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

Comment: The PRC has been conducting coercive activities since at least 2021. The PLA Air Force, Navy, and the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) have conducted aggressive actions around Taiwan and its offshore islands, and along with the PRC’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia against US Indo-Pacific allies.

The TRA and whatever ‘understandings’ the US had with the PRC was a classic contingent agreement. More specifically, the US position was contingent on the PRC not doing anything coercive or aggressive, not to mention ‘violent.’  Ironically, the legal doctrine, “rebus sic stantibus” is appropriate here. The terms means “change in circumstances” – and therefore an earlier agreement made under circumstances as they were at the time of the agreement is no longer valid. Ironically, this was a legal principle the PRC wielded against the UK when the Hong Kong Treaties were under discussion in the 1970’s and 1980’s.

US National Security Strategy (2022)

The Biden administration stated the following in its 2022 US National Security Strategy (NSS) regarding vital interests: “The United States has a vital interest in deterring aggression by the PRC, Russia, and other states” and “As an Indo-Pacific power, the United States has a vital interest in realizing a region [Indo-Pacific] that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.”

Comment: Up till now, the US has not increased its deterrence against the PRC. In fact, there were occasions that the US reduced its military presence around Taiwan to participate in military exercises (RIMPAC 2022 and 2024) and for operational reasons (deployments to the Middle East). If the CCP chose to attack Taiwan during these periods of lower military presence, it would enhance their potential for success. Additionally, the PRC has become increasingly aggressive against Japan and the Philippines, with little response from the US. When totalitarian dictatorships are not stopped, they will continue their aggression.

Taiwan Needs a More Serious Engagement in their Defense 

Successive Taiwan administrations have allowed the armed forces to wither and did it either intentionally or by negligence. For example, Taiwan’s budget has not risen significantly to meet the threat.

Taiwan has faced the threat of a PRC invasion since 1949 and peaked in 1958 during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In 1979, Taiwan invested 7.58% of its GDP in defense but by 1999 had declined to below 3%.

After 1999, Taiwan’s defense budget consistently fell below 3% of GDP even though every government after 1999 claimed a target of 3%. Taiwan’s defense budget for 2024 is approximately 2.45% of its GDP and will maintain a similar rate in 2025 even though actual funding will rise 7.7% (Graph 1).

In terms of actual monetary investment in defense, in 1999, the PRC rapidly increased its total defense budget from $20.5 billion or approximately double Taiwan’s defense budget ($8.7 billion) in 1999 to in 2023, the PRC’s defense budget ($296 billion) is eighteen times Taiwan’s defense budget ($16.6 billion) in 2023. In other words, in 24 years Taiwan doubles its defense budget while the PRC increases their defense budget by fifteen times!

Colby mentions in his article that Poland plans to invest 5% of its GDP for defense in 2025 and 4% for 2024. Poland joined NATO in 1999, at the same time China began to increase its defense investment. From 1999 until 2023, Poland’s defense investment averaged only 1.95% with a low of 1.75% in 2008 and high of 3% in 2023 (a rise related to the Russia-Ukraine war; previous high was 2.39 in 2022). Poland’s investment plan of 5% GDP is good for next year due to the Russian threat, but it should have started years earlier. Poland is a good example of how a country can rise to the meet the threat. Israel is a better case study for Taiwan by Israel maintaining high levels of investment over a long period of time.

Taiwan should look at the example of Israel of a country surrounded by hostile rich neighbors with a large population, just like the PRC is described in relation to Taiwan. Israel has continuously invested in its defense from a high of 30.46% of its GDP in 1975 and a low of 4.5% in 2022. In 2023, Israeli GDP defense spending rose to 5.3% and will rise to 6.6%, and probably more, in 2024 due to the multi-front war (see Graph 3 below).

The next chart (Graph 4) lists military expenditure by Taiwan and Israel as percentage of GDP from 1976-2023.

Graph 4 demonstrates that Israel’s defense expenditure as a proportion of GDP dropped continuously from 1976 until 1995 and stabilized at between six and five percent of GDP.

Discussions with Taiwanese experts provided me the opportunity to create a series of graphs that clearly shows in every dimension that Israel has invested more in defense than Taiwan using SIPRI data. Below are the two countries’ defense budgets based on current prices, converted at the exchange rate for the given year is below (Graph 5) from 1988-2023.

As can be seen in Graph 5, Taiwan invested more than Israel prior to 2000, but Israel gradually outspent Taiwan until 2023 where Israel spent $27.5 billion compared to Taiwan’s investment of $16.6 billion (or 66% more).

Graph 6 provides military expenditure per capita by both countries in US dollars, 1988-2023. The difference is significant. The key to understanding this graph is that Israel’s population is 9.4 million while Taiwan’s population is 23.4 million or 2.5 times the population of Israel. In effect, every Israeli funds their defense expenditure 4.3 times more than a Taiwanese. However, average 2024 annual income in Israel is $43,608, while in Taiwan it is $21,432.

Graph 7 lists military expenditure by country as percentage of government spending, 2000-2023.

From 2022-2023, Taiwan appears to be increasing their share of government spending close to Israel’s share.

Israel took an aggressive approach to investing in its defense mainly due to the desire to be prepared for persistent adversaries, especially Iran and its surrogates. Taiwan should also strive to continue to greatly increase its investments in its national security. My challenge to Taiwanese officials is to say: do not tell me why you cannot, tell me how hard you are trying, detailing the success areas, and a strategy based on a timeline to meet or exceed responding to the threat posed by the PRC.

Note 1: Taiwan’s SIPRI’s data includes the official defense budget, and the two off budget procurement mechanisms adopted recently in response to growing threats from China. These include the special budget for new combat aircraft since 2020 and Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan since 2022. In 2023, these two funds totaled NTD 108.3 billion (USD 3.5 bn), compared to the official defense budget of NTD 409.2 billion (USD 13.1 bn).

Note 2: The entire spending series for Israel was revised in 2020. Military spending in Israel is based on data provided by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Central bureau of Statistics. It gives actual military spending published every year by the Israeli MOF.

Recommendations

Taiwan and the US have failed each other. We are deep in the danger zone of the “Decade of Concern” — that period of increased likelihood of a PRC invasion of Taiwan from 2020 to 2030. Since 2021, I have been making the same clarion call that Elbridge Colby has made. However, the US and Taiwan are reticent about pushing the emergency button. With a lot of creative thinking by both governments, many actions can be taken to frustrate the CCP’s planned take-over of Taiwan. The US needs to demonstrate that it can “uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain our capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan” (2022 NSS) by acting now. Why should the US wait until the CCP attacks Taiwan? By demonstrating US and Taiwanese resolve, the CCP would be deterred.

Below are some clear recommendations for each government that should immediately be implemented until a balance of power is restored by Taiwan and the US in accordance with the TRA. Taiwan and the US should determine a cost sharing agreement for these actions.

For the US:

1. Strategically, Congress and the President of the US should approve a joint resolution similar to the 2001 Public Law “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF) and the January 1955 Joint Resolution called the “Authorization for the President To Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa [ROC], the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area” (APEAF). The APEAF stated the following and the new version should contain similar vocabulary regarding protecting vital interests:

“Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China [Taiwan] are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores…

“Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

“Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; …

“Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa, and the Pescadores against armed attack.

“This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.”

2. The President should immediately submit the required 48-hour notification to Congress in accordance War Powers Resolution in response to the direct threat to Taiwan, neighboring countries, and to vital U.S. interests along the First Island Chain by the PRC. The US should be prepared to take action in concert with Taiwanese forces, friendly regional forces, and others to deter PRC aggression and to preserve the integrity of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. These actions are in exercise of the US inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Although it is not possible to predict the precise scope and duration of this deployment, the US Armed Forces will remain so long as their presence is required to contribute to the security of the region and desired by the Taiwanese government and other allied governments. The military activity would include the forward deployment of substantial elements of the US Armed Forces into the region including air, naval, and ground forces. Some of the specific actions that should be implemented are listed below.
3. Greatly increase US military assets near or in Taiwan. For example, instead of increasing US military presence near Taiwan, the US made Taiwan more vulnerable when DOD recently directed the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to leave a gap in US Navy carrier aviation coverage near Taiwan for approximately three weeks to head to the Middle East to help deter Iran from attacking Israel. At a minimum, the US should have deployed several fighter squadrons to forward bases in Japan and the Philippines to compensate for the loss of deterrence that up to 90 aircraft a US Navy aircraft carrier can sustain.

Even if the Abraham Lincoln CSG was near Taiwan, the US still could forward deploy additional US fighters on a continuous basis as an assurance to Taiwan and US allies and to deter CCP’s expansionist plans.

4. Conduct combined US-ROC exercises with all allied nations in the region near or in Taiwan. For example, conduct USAF bomber and USAF/USMC/USN fighter forward basing combined and joint exercises.
5. Develop and conduct counter “grey zone” actions along with partners and allies.

In 1955, General Benjamin O. Davis created the Taiwan Strait median line to promote peace by providing ample warning for each side to react to a possible attack and to prevent either side from conducting a surprise attack.

The US president, Congress and the US military should have reacted directly against the PLA incursions crossing the median line and other closer approaches around Taiwan. For example, the US military could have sent large numbers of US military ships and aircraft through the Straits until the PLA stopped crossing the median line. The ROC military and other militaries could have joined US forces crossing the Straits and even the midline. In other words, the US and Taiwan did not take a stand and consequently, the Davis Line no longer exists.

6. Permanently station US Navy and Coast Guard (USCG) assets in international waters off the coast of Taiwan such as AEGIS capable ships to help mitigate the PLA missile threat.
7. Deploy THAAD to Taiwan or at least to the southern Japanese islands (Senkakus) and to the northern Philippines islands to provide enhanced missile defense coverage of Taiwan.
8. The US should assist Taiwan to build submarine bases on the east side of the island to provide more protection for their new submarines and to service allied submarines.
9. Convert retiring US Navy warships to USCG ships to match the large size of CCG ships or gift them to Taiwan and other allied countries’ coast guard. The same applies to all excess or retiring coast guard or other services weapon systems.
10. If warranted, deploy nuclear weapons in or near Guam, Taiwan, and other locations. When the PRC threatened to invade Taiwan in 1958, this worked.

For Taiwan:

1. Conduct Constitutional actions to rapidly prepare the whole of society for a potential conflict. For example, the only times that Taiwan published a National Security Strategy (NSS) was in 2006 (Chinese) and 2008 (English translation) during the Chen Shui-bian Administration. Since then, no Taiwanese government has published anything similar. The executive should publish an NSS (one unclassified and one classified as is standard practice) to guide the government, inform Taiwanese, allies, and foes what Taiwan’s overall strategic plan is, where it is going and how it is going to get there. I wrote a suggested way forward for Taiwan in 2022 using the US and Israel as case studies.
2. Budget a minimum of 5% of Taiwan’s GDP every year to prepare the Taiwanese population for war by using a whole of society resilience and resistance approach. War is not just the province of the military.

This would mean investing approximately an additional $20 billion USD. Taiwan’s large foreign reserves (almost $580 billion USD as of August 2024, fifth largest in the world, and rising) could help fund this endeavor. Some have argued that private industry could help the Taiwanese government. For example, increase tax rates for industry to increase the defense budget. Local industry could assist Taiwan in developing and producing weapon systems at a reduced profit rate.

If Taiwan does not figure out how to invest now for its defense, Taiwan could not only loose the country, but the CCP could take all of Taiwan’s foreign reserves.

3. Reservist and Conscripts: conduct combat training for the ~1.66 million reservists for 30-60 days per year. The Israel Defense Forces does this. If Taiwan cannot do this, then they should provide a plan to ensure that their forces are and will continue to be maximumly lethal based on the threat.

The current program of a two-week annual training period is inadequate based on training time and numbers trained. If Taiwan does not have the land to increase the numbers trained and time trained, then Taiwan should purchase more land to build sites to conduct training for the reservists or train outside of Taiwan. Taiwan should greatly increase the number of US and other allies’ military personnel training the ROC military, much like the lethal training the US and NATO conducted for the Ukrainian military from 2017 until today.

In 2024, 9,127 conscripts will be drafted. This is grossly insufficient considering that there are a total of 107,713 males who are eligible in 2024. From an outside observer, there are too many exceptions to postpone service or other exceptions for military service where only 8.5% of eligible males are conscripted.

4. Teach, train, and exercise the population to be resilient during war and how to resist the PLA. For example, have the Taiwan government teach and adapt the “Resistance Operating Concept” (developed by Otto Fiala and NATO Special Forces) with Taiwanese democratic characteristics to the entire adult population of Taiwan and begin by teaching it in high school to both males and females. Community resilience preparation (training, exercises, weapons familiarization, communication equipment, food, water, health/medicine, and sheltering) will prevent Taiwan from collapsing during a PLA attack.

Since owning guns by private civilians in Taiwan is illegal (except for approved aboriginal hunters), I have suggested setting up simulator shooting ranges for rifles and hand guns just as the Taiwanese Central Police University has to train its police officers (besides actual shooting). Even better, Taiwan’s government could modify the law and allow actual guns to be used in new shooting ranges managed by the police or aboriginal Taiwanese.

5. Taiwan should produce and purchase massive numbers of anti-ship (including sea mines), anti-missile, anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-drone weapon systems and secure depots and storage sites to be able to sustain themselves during a potential blockade and/or invasion. Taiwan should also ensure that the number of personnel trained is resilient enough to ensure redundancy in case of attrition.
6. Request military equipment that is being decommissioned or being phased out by the US and other countries to be re-purposed for Taiwan such as the Japanese E-2Cs (being replaced by E-2Ds) or US Navy ships to be scrapped. This recommendation would apply to other countries such as the Philippines that also need weapon systems such as submarines (Japan could transfer its older submarines), E-2C aircraft, and other weapon systems.

Conclusion

Taiwan continues down the road of slow incrementalism. It’s time to break the glass or the other side will do it first. Innovative thinking and thinking outside of the box have to occur. Taiwan needs to try everything they can to get out in front of this threat.

The US also is paralyzed in thinking and actions. The US thinks it can manage its relationship with the PRC and that the US knows the PRC’s “red lines” (they could be bluffing), but the US has not stated clearly what the US “red lines” are. We act passively after every act of CCP aggression. The CCP has changed the status quo and is preparing for war. The US does not call the CCP out when they conduct aggression and, most importantly, the US does not do any counteraction to show our “displeasure” by deterring the CCP.

Let us do the right thing – make Taiwan safe from CCP aggression and enforce the TRA.

The Taiwanese people enjoy their freedom but the strategic failure to not aggressively deter the CCP will only lead to the nightmare of what Russia is doing to Ukraine.

The US and Taiwan need to restore deterrence against PRC aggression. Abraham Lincoln provides us the guidance needed: “The best way to predict your future is to create it.”